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Abstract

With the popularization of wireless network, security issue is more and more important.
When IEEE 802.11i draft proposed TKIP, it is expected to improve WEP (Wired
Equivalent Privacy) on both active and passive attack methods. Especially in generating
and management of secret keys, TKIP uses more deliberative attitude to distribute keys.
Besides, it just upgrades software to accomplish these functions without changing
hardware equipments. However, implementing TKIP on the exiting equipment, the
transmission performance is decreased dramatically. This article presents a new scheme,
Burglarproof WEP Protocol (BWP), that encrypt WEP key twice to improve the security
drawbacks of original WEP, and have better performance on transmission. The proposed
method is focus on modifying encryption sets to improve the low performance of TKIP,
and provides better transmission rate without losing security anticipations base on
current hardware configuration.
Keywords: WLAN, IEEE 802.11 Family, WEP, TKIP, BWP

1. Introduction
With the development of science and technology, people are deeper and deeper in
reliance on the Internet. In 1999, IEEE released a series of wireless LANs (WLAN)
standards, 802.11 [1]. Wireless network brings people a heavy one convenient is the user
mobility. The modern WLANs offer many benefits to networking, such as mobility,
scalability, flexibility, installation easily, and so on. From cost perspective, it can save
installation cost for short term and maintenance expense for long term cost. It is
especially attractive to those environments where physical Ethernet cable deployment is
not favored.
As statement in wireless LAN specifications, the date frames of WLAN are similar to the
ones of Ethernet. For WLAN, the data transmission media is air-waves via air. Therefore,
the base station will receive all WLAN clients’ information in one particular service area.
Due to air-wares can pass through the barriers, such as ceiling, floor and wall, so data
transmission might be received by unexpected receiver who from different floors or
buildings. Therefore, setting up a WLAN just like place numerous Ethernet ports
everywhere. For this reason, security is the most important major for wireless LANs.
In the definition of IEEE 802.11[1] standard, a WLAN must provide three base
Networking security service: authentication, confidentiality, and integrity, but related
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documents [4][5] indicate that it cannot guarantee the data confidentiality of WLAN
transmission when using basic encryption of based Wireless Network security service,
and invaders can use WEP(RC4) encryption’s defects or destroy the related program of
WEP to find the secret key, even more capture the content of transmission data.
To reinforce 802.11 series, Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance (WECA) raised
some proposals about secure suggestions of WLAN [6], such as management of secret
KEY, installing VPN environment and so on. Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) proposed 802.11i WLAN Draft standard specification and
reformed known security loopholes of 802.11 WLAN standards which were established
previously by IEEE. Nevertheless, this Draft’s standard specification hasn’t approved
until now. However, the demand for improving WLAN transmission security is very
urgent. Because WEP has loophole of encrypting, and TKIP will make efficiency bad, we
hope to propose a schema that can give consideration to the security and transmit
efficiency.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section overviews
WEP and TKIP mechanisms. Then, the third portion presents the proposed new protocol
schema. Section four is the simulation results about the comparison of TKIP and BWP.
This paper concludes in section 5 with a summary and brief discussion of related work
and other potential applications

2. Current Security Schemes: WEP and TKIP
Because of the way of WLAN process message’s transmission uses radio broadcast, so its
data more easily to wiretap then common network. Therefore, IEEE designed an
encryption’s function and expects WLAN user can obtain privacy as same normal wired
networking. This encryption function is called WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy). WEP
offers basic security protection for data transmission and prevents third party steal
communication data. Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 describe the WEP encryption and integrity
checking mechanisms. By now it is well-known that WEP is insecure and should not be
counted on to provide any security. The vulnerabilities of WEP can be concluding on
four design flaws: WEP does not specify a mechanism for key management; WP does not
specify a mechanism for generating IVs; there s no replay protection; and CRC32 is not a
cryptographic integrity checker. [27]
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Figure 1: WEP Encryption Flowchart

Figure 2: WEP Decryption Flowchart
At 2002, 802.11i [3] proposed TKIP protocol as temporary solution for the drawback of
previous methods. It upgrades from WEP and quickly modifies current WEP loopholes.
TKIP remains the method of WEP RC4 Encryption and improve the generation and
management functions of WEP Key. TKIP uses MIC (Message Integrity Code) to protect
transmission channel form auto-attack. The network security can be improved by
upgrading software and leave the hardware to its original architecture.
To strengthen WEP encryption function, TKIP still uses original PRNG RC4 cipher of
WEP, but added few steps before WEP PRING to strengthen the security of data
transmission It can make each packet use different encryption secret key (Per-Packet
Keying). The main characteristic of TKIP describes as below:
y
y
y
y
y

Message Integrity Code (MIC)
Sequence Counter
Dynamic key management (Re-Keying)
Countermeasures
Key mixing

Because of TKIP changed the method of KEY generation and management, therefore,
it can accomplish the safety function to reinforce the security of data transmission.
However, the encryption algorithm is more complexity such that the performance of
network throughput is seriously decreased. TKIP has three places which can discard
received packet while decrypting procedure, as show in figure 4:
(1) Sequence is wrong.
(2) WEP engine cannot encrypt.
(3) MIC checking is not correct.
Each TKIP packet use two phases to generate 128Bits encrypted KEY. While identifying
MIC information security, at the same time, it must compute each MSDU by MIC and
bring TSC into Phase2’s Mixing; The MIC of TKIP input is the sharing MIC Key of AP
446
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and Client, and the 64 Bit MIC Key is generated by DA/SA/Payload of MSDU. It is
equal to 20 Bit’s key encrypt to MSDU. This action increases a lot of Overhead and
increases transmission AP Throughput.

Figure 3: TKIP Key Mixing Encryption Flowchart

Figure 4: TKIP MSDU Decryption Flowchart
As Figure 5 shows, we experiment on practical environment. When using one 802.11g
AP and one Notebook to connect 802.11g wireless NIC card of PCMCIA, which connect
to 802.11g, 54 Mbps transmission mode; also use NetIO Corporation’s Chariot version
4.0 software to test and observe the transmission flow without using TKIP encryption.
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Figure 6 shows the average throughput between access point and client without TKIP
encryption that using Chaiot to simulate traffic. As concludes from Figure 6, we can see
that average throughput is 19.4 Mbps. Then enables TKIP function on AP and Notebook,
and uses the same conditions to experiment the throughput on AP side. The result is
shown in Figure 7. We can obtain the actual throughput is 12.4 Mbps. From the
experiment result, we can conclude that the method of TKIP encryption seriously
decreases the efficient throughput of AP.

Figure 5: TKIP testing platform

Figure 6: transmission flow at 802.11g without enable TKIP
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Figure 7: transmission flow at 802.11g that enable TKIP function

3. Proposed Method: Burglarproof WEP Protocol
As previous section described, TKIP resolve the security drawbacks of WEP, but it also
causes serious throughput diminished. This section will propose a novel schema:
Burglarproof WEP Protocol, BWP, which modifies the process of WEP Key generation
on TKIP. Compare with TKIP, the proposed protocol neither change nor increase
hardware cost, and narrow down hardware computing quantities. Further, BWP reduces
authentication frequency but can provide security function as well as TKIP and will not
affect the performance of throughput. The features of BWP include three parts: first, the
process of WEP KEY generation, second, the form of Frame Integrity Code, FIC, and the
last, user authorization.
The design principles of BWP must be satisfied as following rules:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

Use the simple schema to cover WEP drawbacks and provide the same secure
transfer function as TKIP.
All clients use the same secret key. The key will be easy to management, and
it can speed up key updating synchronously for all users.
Use the WEP RC4 encryption method. America restricts within export of
encryption-decryption technique. For this issue, BWP continually uses RC4
encryption method to conform exporting criteria.
Resolve the loopholes in the RC4 wake key.
The IV field is 4 bytes to narrow down the length of packet header.
The identical IV does not generate the same RC4 encryption seed so that to
prevent packet collection attraction.
After run out of 24 bits IV key, new WEP Key will be generated so that to
prevent packet collection attraction.
At the initial communication status, clients use the same default WEP key, but
when they start to transfer data, they will use temporal key to avoid stealing of
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default WEP key.
(9) When receiver finds the packet sequence number is the same or smaller, it
discards packet to prevent active attack.
(10) The proposed protocol could be implemented on current hardware, ARM7 or
ARM9 CPU, with update firmware.
(11) Use temporal key to make authentication that could resolve core error
problem.
Figure 8 shows the frame structure of BWP MPDU. The length of IV field is 4 bytes that
shorter than TKIP but the same with WEP. BWP adds 3 bytes Frame Integrity Code
(FIC) field between Data field and ICV field. The frame structure of BWP is very similar
with TKIP and WEP. BWP is draw up to use PRNG RC4 cipher as well as WEP and
TKIP, but the generation steps of WEP key that before WEP PRNG are less than TKIP.
The encryption fields of BWP protocol are Data, FIC, and ICV.

Figure 8 BWP MPDU Frame
As usual, BWP use TKIP RC4 cipher engineer to execute encryption, it contents three
components: the generation of new secret WEP key, authentication of BWP and IV
generation. The detail encryption flow is addressing as following:
Step 1. Generation of new secret WEP key
When client joins AP domain first time, it sends a random number to AP. Then, both AP
and client sides do hashing function to product new secret key synchronously and records
client MAC address at AP. This random number is for synchrony to notified AP that the
client will send data. And then, AP generates another random number and sends it to
client. Using this new secret key to be the new WEP key can avoid fixed default secret
key (default WEP key) be founded. The process is shown in figure 9.
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Figure 9: generation process of New Secret Key
Step 2. Authentication of BWP
After generate new secret key, AP sends random number to client. Then AP and client
use new secret key (generated at step 1) and this random number (sent by AP) to hash
another new secret key1, and use this new secret key1 as the authentication, as shown in
figure 10. All BWP encryption actives will use this new secret key 1 to encrypt
transformation data to instead of default WEP key. The new secret key is only for
authentication. After pass authenticated, it will be discard. Even if the attacker uses core
error that proposed by Marylan [5] to gain new secret key1, they cannot be backward to
new WEP key and then cannot transfer data or detect packet content.

Figure 10: generation process of New Secret Key1
Step 3. IV Generation
IV Generator is to manage the generation of IV24Bits. IV Generator will filter Strong IV
Number and after run out of IV24Bits， it will notify client and AP to update new WEP key.
IV generator can avoid producing RC4 wake key, too. As example, when the first byte of
IV value is between from 3 to 14 and the second byte is FF can be backward to secret
key. Use IV generator can filter strong IV number and combines new secret key to
generate RC4 cipher seed64bits (include IV).

Figure 11: the steps of IV generator
Step 4. Update steps of secret key:
When run out of IV24bits value, secret key will update. The client send random number to
AP and then AP and client do hashing function to product new secret key synchronously
and records at both client and AP sides. The shorter the IV field is, the faster the secret
key update. Show as figure 12.
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Figure 12: update steps of secret key
Step 5. Frame Integrity Code (FIC) : frame confidential detection
The FIC field is generated 24 bits initial sequence number by hashing with new secret
key and sender’s TA (transmitter MAC address). CRC32 frame check includes this field
and the ICV (integrity check value) is locating after FIC field.
Generate steps of Sequence Number shows as follows:
Sequence Number (24bits) = SHA1 (newSecret (40bits), Random Number (16bits))
The output MPDU of BWP shows as follows:
Message: M; Sequence Number: N
Compute integrity checksum ICV = c(M+N), using CRC32
The plaintext P = { M+N || c(M+N) }
Encrypt P using RC4: cipher text C = (P ⊕ RC4 (IV, newSecret Key))
Transmit C’ = IV, (P ⊕ RC4 (IV, newSecret Key))
BWP adds 24 bits sequence number field after data payload in the MPDU frame. It will
accumulate this sequence number for the following MPDU frame. After runs out of IV
and updating secret key, the sequence number will regenerate. The complete frame
structure is shown in figure 8. If frame error occurs, AP will separate this user for one
minute.
In order to get batter decryption performance, BWP use the same decryption method with
802.11 WEP. The FIC field records sequence number in each MPDU frame. When
decryption progressing, SWTP compares sequence number in the frame. This can ensure
the integrity of each frame and prevent active attack. Figure 13 and 14 shows the
encryption and decryption flow chart of BWP.
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Figure 13: encryption steps of BWP

Figure 14: BWP Decryption Flowchart

4. Simulation and Results
BWP provide the same security rank with TKIP. But the different between BWP and
TKIP are the ways of key generation and data confidential detection. Both BWP and
TKIP can prevent current WEP attacks and drawbacks by upgrading firmware. Table 1
shows the mapping of attack methods versus protection schemas for BWP and TKIP.
However, BWP has better throughput than TKIP.
As shown in figure 5, we construct an infrastructure wireless LAN to evaluate throughput
practically. In this WLAN environment, there is an 802.11g AP with ARM9 100MHz
CPU, and perform BWP and TKIP by software coding. The client is a notebook which
using 802.11g PCMCIA wireless LAN adapter. The traffics are produced by Chariot,
version 4.0, and uses maximum transmission speed to observe the throughput under three
infrastructure modes: no data encryption, enable TKIP, and enable BWP.

453

The Tenth Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems (PACIS 2006)

Table 1: Protection schema for BWP and TKIP
Attack method

BWP protection schema

TKIP protection schema

Forgery (Bit-Flip)

FIC (Frame Integrity Code)

MIC(Message Integrity Code)

Weak-Key Attacks Weak key will be filtered
Collision Attacks Secret Key Update
Replay Attacks
Sequence Number

Dynamic Key
Re-Keying
Sequence Number

Throughput of Wireless security schema

802.11g

TKIP

BWP

20
18
16

bit per second

14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1

176 351 526 701 876 1051 1226 1401 1576 1751 1926 2101 2276 2451 2626 2801 2976 3151 3326 3501 3676 3851 4026 4201 4376
Time

Figure 15: Throughput of BWP, TKIP and 802.11g

Figure 15 is the experiment results. Analyzing figure 15, we can find that if data delivers
without any secure protection, the average throughput is 15.778Mbps. But once enable
TKIP protocol, the average throughput is down to 9.301 Mbps. However, if enable BWP
protocol, the average throughput is raising to 14.994Mbps. From this experimentation,
we can find that the BWP is indeed improving the inefficiency throughput problem cause
by TKIP.
From the simulation result we can find that BWP have better performance than TKIP.
The performance of throughput just follows 802.11 that is no encryption schema enabled.
The result is converged in table 2. It is very clearly to observe that the proposed schema
have better performance. The Chariot generates whole wireless 802.11g frames with
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complete header at full speed. The more the clients consume bandwidth, the more packets
fill on the transmission channel. The packets collision and retransmission will increase
due to WLAN employs CSMA/CA algorithm over layer 2 protocol. The total traffic
increases but the efficient data throughput won’t increase relatively. Even at this
situation, BWP has better performance than TKIP when mentions about three clients.
Also, the efficient throughput is greater than TKIP. Following, we will discuss more
about the transfer appearance under BWP versus TKIP for multi-clients.

Table 2: Practical Lab testing of multi-clients
Average
One Client
Two Clients
Three Clients
(Mbps)
No encryption Pair1= 15.961
Pair1= 8.955
Pair1= 6.150
Totals= 15.778
Pair2= 8.940
Pair2= 6.101
Totals= 17.779
Pair3= 5.919
Totals= 17.890
BWP
Pair1= 14.994
Pair1= 8.715
Pair1= 6.207
Totals= 14.994
Pair2= 7.337
Pair2= 6.147
Totals= 15.947
Pair3= 6.004
Totals= 18.270
TKIP
Pair1= 9.362
Pair1= 4.948
Pair1= 3.950
Totals= 9.301
Pair2= 5.457
Pair2= 3.212
Totals= 10.364
Pair3= 3.883
Totals= 11.045

5. Conclusions
Unfortunately, at present wireless network environment, WEP and TKIP are unable to
give consideration to the security and performance at the same time. Analyzing TKIP
protocol, we inference that the critical reason of low throughput is TKIP’s algorithm. In
TKIP, the major algorithm of encryption is message integrity code, called Michael. It is
too complexity to increase performance. Even though, it is still need a security scheme to
improve network security efficiently. The most important thing is the manager should use
appropriate encryption protocol to ensure their data transform security when
communicate on wireless LAN. The proposed method, BWP, provide better performance
and throughput to transfer data. The inductive reasons are two: first, at the same packet
size, the BWP protocol overhead is shorter than TKIP; second, the TKIP encryption
schema is much complexity than BWP. At the same time, it gives consideration to data
delivering security. Data delivering from client to AP or from AP to client is the worst
link for security issue, and a lot of attacks are occurred at this point. BWP not only avoids
current security problems but also has better throughput. WEP and SSID can use to
separate wireless domain.
For more advance application, the enterprise or security sensitive organizations,
802.1x or VPN are suggested to enhance user authentication and secure data
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delivering. Although VPN can support better transmission protection, the traffic
overhead is too large to utilize bandwidth efficiently. In practically, if IPSec function
is enable, data throughput will cut down to 30% ~ 40%, and it will be worse when
multiple client accesses. IEEE is now studying use 802.11i to replace of current WEP
encryption. Wireless LAN manager can choice various specifications from different
vendors on the market to protect their WLAN. But without identical standard, the
compatible problem will persecute users when purchasing different brands. There are
a lot of new protocols be provided to assist wireless network transformation security.
But the 802.1x environment is very complicated for general users, and VPN will
deliver a lot of conditions data to decrease throughput of valid data. BWP is easy to
implement in every environment and will not raise hardware cost. It is suit for popular
users.
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